Abstract: Our previous paper (McCabe and Snyder 2014) contained the provocative result that, while providing a small boost to cites on average across academic articles, open access can reduce cites to some articles, in particular those published in lower-tier journals. We propose a simple theoretical model in which open access to an article leads more readers to acquire the full text, yielding more cites from some of them but fewer cites from readers who would have cited the article based on superficial knowledge but who refrain once they learn that the article is poorly done or irrelevant. This simple model yields a series of empirical predictions which we test with data for over 200,000 science articles grouped into bins measured by cites received during a pre-study period. Consistent with the theory, the marginal effect of open access is negative for the least-cited articles, positive for the most cited, and generally monotonic for quality levels in between. Also consistent with the theory is that these effects are magnified when articles are placed on, PubMed Central, a particularly broad and convenient open-access platform.
Introduction
Scholarly journals play a key role in certifying and disseminating research among scholars. A growing debate concerns whether this role might be better performed by open-access than traditional journals. Traditional journals earn most of their revenues through library subscription fees, which especially in the case of commercial publishers have risen to the point that they present a substantial barrier to access (Bergstrom 2001 , Bergstrom and Bergstrom 2004 , Dewatripont et al. 2006 ). This barrier is removed by open-access journals, which allow free online access to their articles. One of our previous papers, McCabe and Snyder (2014b) , called into question the validity of these early studies' findings. We showed that such huge estimated effects arise spuriously in a cross section when one fails to account for differences in quality between openand closed-access content. Using a detailed panel data, we were able to knock the estimated effect of open access from over 600% in a specification that did not include any controls down to a modest 8% in our preferred specification controlling for quality with a rich set of fixed effects.
2
McCabe and Snyder (2014b) leveled some of the provocative results of the previous literature but raised some provocative results of its own. The 8% boost from open access was found to be concentrated among the higher-tier journals in the sample; open access led to a 1 Lawrence (2001) studied a sample of articles in the proceedings of a computer-science conference, some of which were available only in print, some openly accessible online. The open-access articles received 336% more cites. Harnad and Brody (2004) studied the citation rates of published physics articles, some of which were also selfarchived by the author on arXiv (a large, online repository offering free downloads of scientific manuscripts). Selfarchived articles averaged 298% more cites than the others. Walker (2004) studied an oceanography journal that allowed authors to buy open access for their articles, finding 280% more downloads for open-access articles. archived articles averaged 298% more cites than the others. Walker (2004) studied an oceanography journal that allowed authors to buy open access for their articles, finding 280% more downloads for open-access articles. Eysenbach (2006) studied the effect of open access on citations to Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) articles. See Craig et al. (2007) for a survey of research on the citation boost from open access. 2 In addition to identifying the defects of cross-sectional studies, McCabe and Snyder (2014b) also points out defects of a panel-data study, Evans and Reimer (2009) , which uses the panel to control for article quality but does not adequately control for time and age effects. McCabe and Snyder (2014b) demonstrates the bias that can arise with inadequate controls for these dimensions.
significant reduction in cites among the lower-tier journals in the sample. That open access could actually reduce cites is surprising and begs explanation. Is it a statistical fluke, perhaps associated with having broken the results down into too many categories or, worse, indicating a problem with the overall methodology? Or is it a systematic outcome further study of which could contribute to a deeper understanding of the mechanism by which open access boosts citations?
The present paper provides theoretical and empirical support for the latter view. In Section 2 we construct a simple theoretical model offering an explanation of the negative effect of open access for low-quality content. The idea behind the model is that open access facilitates acquisition of full text of the article. Obviously this may lead to an increase in cites as readers who would not have bothered before cite it after reading the full text and finding it relevant. On the other hand may be an effect going in the other direction. Some readers are content to cite some articles on the basis of superficial knowledge of its title or abstract information, perhaps borrowing a handful of references from some other sources to round out the reference list, without reading it first. If the cost of acquiring the article's full text is reduced by a move to open access, the reader may decide to acquire it. After reading it, the reader may find the research less solid or the topic less relevant than initially thought and may decide not to cite it.
For the lowest-quality content, the only hope of being cited may be "sight unseen" (pun Finding evidence consistent with these additional predictions provides confidence in the theoretical and empirical results.
The rest of the paper is devoted to these empirical tests. Sections 3 and 4 describe the data and methods. The sample is the same as in McCabe and Snyder (2014b) , consisting of citation counts during the ten year period during which open access was an emerging policy for over 200,000 articles in subfields of science. Here we take full advantage of article-level detail, while the previous paper aggregated the data by combining all the articles published by a journal in a year. We rely where possible on the methodology developed in the previous paper, extending it where necessary to accommodate the article-level analysis.
The results are presented in Sections 5 and 6. Section 5 reprises the main provocative results from the previous paper and links them to the theory. Section 6 reports new results breaking articles into quality bins, where the bins are based on cites received by articles during a pre-study period. This provides more detail on how the open-access effect varies across the quality spectrum. As a further test of the theory, we see if how this pattern differs depending on whether open access is provided only through the journal's own website or whether the article is effectively pivots the open-access effect so that it is even more sensitive to quality, resulting in greater losses to low-quality articles and greater gains to high-quality articles. PubMed Central access reduces cites to articles in the zero-or one-cite bins by around 14% while increasing cites to articles in the 11-or-more-cites bin by 11%.
Our paper is part of the literature that attempts to identify the causal effect of open access on citations more carefully by moving beyond simple cross-sectional regressions. Davis et al. (2008) conduct a field experiment in which articles from American Physiological Society journals were randomly selected for open access, finding little causal effect. Gaule and Maystre (2011) take an instrumental-variables approach, instrumenting for authors' endogenous decision to pay a $1,000 fee to have their Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) articles openly accessible using the timing of budget cycles, again finding little causal effect.
We already discussed the two papers, Evans and Reimer (2009) and McCabe and Snyder (2014b) , taking a panel-data approach to identification of the causal effect. None of these papers provides theory or provides empirical results across articles of different qualities as we do here.
The present paper is related to the broader literature looking for "long tail" or "superstar" effects of Internet distribution. Recent studies suggest that online retailing boosts sales more for products in the long tail, in markets ranging from clothing (Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Simester 2007) to video sales (Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee 2008) . McCabe and Snyder (2014a) find that the increase in citations from moving from print to digital access through JSTOR is fairly uniform across article qualities. The present paper shares the interest in measuring potentially heterogeneity in effects between popular and unpopular items, but studies a change in the price of Internet access rather than the move from off-Internet to on-Internet distribution. The theoretical model and findings that open access disproportionately benefits superstar content and reduces cites in the long-tail are new in the present paper.
Theory

Model
At the outset of the game, we take as given the existence of a continuum of articles. Let ∈ [0,1] denote an article's quality, a random variable that has a distribution over the population of articles characterized by density function ( ) and distribution function ( ). Quality will take on a specific meaning here as the probability that the article is relevant to a reader's research. An article may end up being low quality if it is poorly done, on a narrow topic, or both; so quality here can have both vertical and horizontal dimensions.
These articles may receive cites from a continuum of readers with mass normalized to 1.
Readers have different "types" given by the gross benefit ∈ [0, ∞) each receives from citing relevant research. Let be the probability measure associated with . Readers have the opportunity to cite an article. The article's quality, ∈ [0,1], is a random variable with cumulative distribution function . Let � = ( ) denote mean quality.
Readers are the only strategic players in the game. A reader has three strategies open to him regarding each article. First, he can simply ignore the article. Second, he can cite the paper in a superficial way based on his knowledge of author, title, and abstract information, obtained from background knowledge, literature searches, and cross-references from articles on hand.
Finally, he can acquire the full text of the article and, if it turns out to be relevant, issue a deeper cite of it. Assume the reader makes this decision without knowing an article's quality but only the distribution of quality across the population of articles.
Normalize the reader's payoff from not citing the article to 0. His expected payoff from issuing a superficial cite without acquiring the full text is
An article of quality provides an expected gross benefit of , the value to the reader of type of citing relevant research times the probability an article of that quality is relevant. In order to avoid the absurd outcome that every reader cites every existing article, we have subtracted a cost of citation, > 0, in the payoff. This term reflects the physical cost of composing the citing passage and bibliography entry; but more importantly, we envisage this term as reflecting the far more substantial cost of leaving a bad impression on one's audience when one cites poor or irrelevant research. The reader's expected payoff from acquiring the full text of the article and issuing a deep cite is
This payoff is similar to (1), involving three modifications. The first modification is that the cost of acquiring the full test of the article, > 0, is subtracted off. We will later use the parameter to perform comparative statics, assuming the move from closed to open access is captured by a reduction in . The access cost includes any fees as well as hassle and delay for articles that are not immediately available on the reader's computer screen after a few mouse clicks. The second modification is that, after acquiring the full text of the article, the reader learns the article's true quality. This affords him the option value of only citing the article if the realized net payoff is positive, captured by the max operator or equivalently by cutting off the tail of low qualities from the associated integral. The third modification is that a deep cite has more value for the reader's research than a superficial one, captured by the factor ≥ 0 multiplying the gross benefit.
( , ) the payoff in equation (2). Both are functions of many parameters; the arguments emphasize the dependence on the parameters we will focus on, the reader's type and the cost of full-text access.
Equilibrium Reader Behavior
Articles differ in quality and access cost . Consider one of these articles. Let ( ) be the set of types strictly preferring not to cite it in equilibrium, ( ) the set of types strictly preferring to cite it superficially, and ( ) the set of types strictly preferring to acquire the full text:
Notice that these sets are functions of but cannot be functions of because readers do not observe before choosing their strategy. These sets characterize readers' citing behavior, partitioning the type space [0, ∞).
There are a variety of possibilities for the structure of this partition. Figure 1 illustrates the richest possibility. An interval of the lowest types do not cite the article. These types can be thought of as lay readers or readers whose research is far from the subfield in question. These types obtain too low a gross benefit to justify the cost of citation or acquisition. The next set of types obtain a slightly higher gross benefit but still low enough that they benefit from the option value of acquiring the full text and seeing if the article is relevant before citing it. Yet higher types are more sure that the gross benefit will cover the citation cost, so can risk superficially citing it. The highest set of types acquire the full text, not because of the option value, which is not worth much to high types almost certain to place a positive net value on citing it, but because their marginal benefit of deeply rather than superficially citing a relevant article, , is very high.
Of course if = 0, there is no such marginal benefit and this last interval would be empty. The fact that acquiring the full text has two possible advantages relative to superficial citing leads to the possibility that ( ) may be constituted by two disconnected intervals. The proofs of Proposition 1 and all subsequent propositions are provided in the appendix.
Citation Counts
Having characterized readers' equilibrium citing behavior, it is a simple matter to tally up the cites received by an article. The article receives no cites for each type in ( ) and one cite for each type in ( ). For each type in ( ), the article is cited with probability , the probability that the reader determines the article is relevant after seeing the full text. Combining these considerations, the mass ( , ) of cites received by an article with quality and access cost is
Comparative Statics
Our chief interest is in characterizing the comparative-static effect of a move from closed to open access-represented by a decrease in acquisition cost from to < -on an article's citation count, ( , ). Open access decreases acquisition cost for readers at institutions who did not subscribe to the fee-based journal. Those readers would have to pay a charge (standard is $30) for the article or go through the interlibrary loan process and wait for the article to be delivered. Even for readers at subscribing institutions, the move to open access facilitates access the article. For example, readers can access the article even when away from the office computer without the need for a virtual-private-network (VPN) connection, which takes time to set up and slows Internet service. All of these cost savings are embodied in the assumption < .
As can be seen from equation (4), the key is to understanding the effects of a move to open access is to determine how a decrease in changes the sets ( ), ( ), and ( ). A decrease in increases the payoff from acquiring the article's full text, ( , ), but leaves the other payoffs the same. This increases the attractiveness of citing deeply relative to the other strategies, moving some of the types from each of the sets ( ) and ( ) into ( ).
Therefore, the mass of types acquiring the full text � ( )� weakly increases, and the masses of and of non-citing types � ( )� and superficially citing types � ( )� weakly decrease, as stated in the following proposition.
Let ∆( , , ) denote the marginal effect on cites when an article of quality move
from closed to open access, measured as a proportionate change:
.
For brevity, we will refer to ∆ as the "open-access effect." Our main propositions all deal with comparative-statics exercises related to how ∆ changes with changes in its arguments. The first two propositions focus on the sign of the open-access effect for articles at the extremes of the quality spectrum.
Proposition 2.
The open-access effect is non-positive for articles of the lowest possible quality; i.e., ∆(0, , ) ≤ 0.
Intuitively, a move to open access has two opposing effects on cites to an article. On the plus side, some reader types go from not citing to acquiring the full text and citing it deeply if relevant. For the articles of the lowest possible quality, this effect does not contribute to cites because readers are almost certain to find the article irrelevant. This leaves just the minus side, that some types go from superficially citing to acquiring the full text of the article. While these types would have cited the article unseen, once they acquire it, they are almost cetain to find it is not worth citing. Thus open access reduces the articles cites by the measure of these types.
Proposition 3.
The open-access effect is non-negative for articles of the highest possible quality; i.e., ∆(1, , ) ≥ 0.
Again, the move to open access has two opposing effects on cites to an article. On the plus side, reader types that go from not citing to acquiring the full text add nearly a full cite each to the count for the highest quality articles because they are almost certain to find the article relevant. There is no minus side, because reader types that go from superficially citing to acquiring the full text of the article are nearly certain to find it relevant and continue citing it.
For highest quality articles, therefore, the move to open access can only increase cites.
Proposition 4.
The open-access effect is non-decreasing and weakly concave in article quality; i.e., ∆( , , )⁄ ≥ 0 and 2 ∆( , , )
The same intuition for why the lowest-quality articles lose and the highest-quality gain cites can also explain why the open-access effect is higher the higher the article's quality. The higher the quality of the article, the more the article gains from those reader types who go from not citing to acquiring the full text because they are more likley to find the article relevant. The higher the quality of the article, the less the article loses from those types who go from superficially citing it to acquiring the full text because they are less likely to find it irrelevant and discontinue citing it.
The concavity of the open-access effect is not a deep insight but simply hinges on our decision, motivated by how it will be measured in the empirical analysis, to express ∆ as a proportionate change. In fact, equation (4) is linear in , implying that open-access effect measured in absolute terms would also be linear in . However, the open-access effect ∆ in (5) is expressed in proportionate terms in ∆. When is low, the base of cites on which the change is calculated is low, leading a given absolute change to translate into a large proportionate change.
On the other hand, when is high, a given absolute change translates into a small proportionate change.
The 
Extensions
In the model, facilitating access to the article's full text can reduce cites by giving the reader a more precise signal of the article's quality, possibly reducing cites to low-quality articles. This is one mechanism for how open access can reduce cites; other mechanisms might be possible and would lead to similar results.
The reduction in cites could come from competition among articles to be cited. For example, acquiring the full text of an article may increase the chance that the reader sees a substitute article in the reference list that he prefers to cite as the basis for a particular idea.
Alternatively, the platforms or search techniques used by readers when looking for open-access articles may lead them to notice more related articles than when looking for closed-access articles. Either way, lower quality articles are more likely to lose in the competition. If open access intensifies an article's exposure to competition, it can reduce cites especially to lowquality content. Although we have worked out the specifics for one particular mechanism, a range of plausible mechanisms could produce similar empirical implications.
The model has the unrealistic implication that certain types of reader may end up citing all articles. To avoid this implication, we can reinterpret the population of articles as being just those in a narrow topic area rather than all academic articles. Alternatively, we could add an awareness function, ( ), equal to the probability that the reader knows about the existence of the article, a necessary condition to be cited. Then no reader would end up citing all articles, just the smaller set of those of which he is aware. The awareness function could factor out of ∆ and not affect any of our implications for the open-access effect.
Data
Our analysis is based on the sample of 100 science journals used in McCabe and Snyder (2014) .
The sample is built around the subfield of ecology, selected among the subfields of hard science because it involves a manageable number of journals and because it experienced substantial growth of open access. The sample includes all of the ecology journals in Thomson ISI's set of indexed journals. This accounts for 60% of the journals in the sample. Of the remaining 40%, 60% were taken from botany, the most closely related subfield to ecology, and 40% from multidisciplinary science and biology, presuming that some ecology and botany research is published in such general-interest journals. We selected the top journals from these latter two 
Methodology
To account for the count-data nature of citations in our panel-data setting, we use a fixed effects
Poisson estimator with the following conditional mean:
(Cites |Age , Access , ( ), ( ))
4 The regression underlying Figures 1 and 2 includes journal fixed effects because the curves could not be identified if finer (either volume or article) fixed effects were included. The assumption allowing us to identify the curves is effectively that journals maintain a consistent quality level over the sample period. We do not make this assumption in the regressions reported in the tables, using finer, article fixed effects there. When article fixed effects are included, age and citation-year fixed effects lose the natural interpretation they have in Figures 1 and 2 , but at that point in the paper , the age and citation-year fixed effects are not of direct interest themselves but are only included as controls to improve the estimation of the online-and open-access variables. 
Aggregate Results
In this section we reprise some of the provocative results from McCabe and Snyder (2014) that motivated the theory presented in Section 2. Table 2 (3) is too crude to test this claim, so we turn to more detailed results next.
Results for Quality Bins
This section provides more detailed estimates of the effect of open access for articles at different points in the quality spectrum. A traditional approach would be to apply quintile regression, minimizing the sum of asymmetrically weighted absolute residuals to yield estimates of specific quintiles. Unfortunately, while this method has recently been extended to the case of count data (Machado and Silva 2005) , no such estimator has been developed for panel count data.
Our version of quintile analysis consists of estimating equation (6) separately for each of five quality bins formed on the basis of their citation counts. In order to avoid bias due to selection of the sample based on residuals, we use different data when constructing these quality bins than we use to estimate the regressions We use citations in the first two years after publication (called the "selection period") to form the quality bins but run the regression using cites in the third and later years (called the "regression period"). We later report results where the bins are based on percentiles (quintiles) of cites, but our preferred procedure will form five bins based on absolute numbers of cites. This is our preferred procedure for forming the bins because enough articles have the same number of cites, especially at the low end of zero, one, or two, that quintile bins end up dividing articles with the same number of cites period into different quintiles at random. Fortunately, we will see that the results are robust to binning procedure.
McCabe and Snyder (2014a) discusses conditions under which binning based on citations in an ex ante period does not lead to bias. Although based on a different sample of business and economics rather than science journals, extensive analysis there showed that the results were similar whether one, two, or three years of cites were included in the ex ante period and whether a gap of various length was allowed between ex ante and ex post periods. We use the same length for the ex ante period (two years) and for the gap (zero years) as the preferred procedure in that paper.
Five quality bins were formed: articles with no cites in the first two years after publication, articles with one cite, articles with 2-5 cites, articles with 6-10 cites, and the remaining articles with 11 or more cites. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics on cites in the ex post period in each of these bins. Not surprisingly, there is a strong correlation in cites across the two periods, as shown by the increase in mean cites reading down that column. The standard deviation and maximum number of cites generally increase reading down the respective columns to higher bins. Table 4 reports the results from estimating equation (6) separately for each of these five bins. As in Table 2 , the regressions include a rich set of controls, but for space considerations we only report the results for the open-access variables of interest. The controls are identical to those used in Table 2 with one exception. Table 2 included quadratic age profiles for each journal to account for the hump-shaped pattern shown in Figure 3 . The sample used for Table 4 excludes the first two years of citation data used to select the bins. The remaining profile in Figure 3 is roughly linear, adequately captured by linear age profiles for each journal. We found the remaining time series after dropping the first two years of data for each article to be too short to reliably estimate quadratic age profiles. Two specifications are reported, one in which First consider the results in column (1), which do not separate out PubMed access. The result is negative for the first three bins and positive for the last two. The -12.3% marginal effect in the 1-cite bin and the 7.7% marginal effect in the 11+ cite bin are both significant at the 1% level. Table 4 on the vertical axis against median cites during the selection period for each bin on the horizontal axis. The grey curve is a quadratic regression line fitting the grey points, providing a summary view of the pattern of the results. The regression line displays many of the features predicted by theory: it starts out below the horizontal axis for the lowest quality articles and eventually rises above it for the highest quality articles. It is monotonically increasing and concave. Indeed, the grey line happens to be the same one used in the schematic diagram in Figure 2 used to illustrate the theory. Again, the pattern of the results is best seen in a graph. Figure 6 graphs the coefficient on PubMed access as the black points and draws the quadratic regression line fitting these points as the black curve. As predicted by theory, the increase in convenience of access when the article is posted on PubMed pivots the curve so that the lowest-quality articles are harmed even more by this form of access and the highest-quality articles benefit even more. Again, the black curve is also the same as used in the schematic diagram in Figure 2 used to illustrate the theory.
Given that the coefficients line up fairly well with the regression lines through them and that the regression lines are the very ones used to illustrate the theory, we have a fairly strong demonstration that the empirical results support the model's theoretical predictions. The one place where the results depart from the theory is in the non-monotonicity in the effect of full open access moving from the 0-cite to the 1-cite bin. The marginal effect dips from -4.6% to -12.3% before rising again to -4.8% in the 2-5 cite bin. The non-monotonicity is less pronounced in the results on the interaction with PubMed access. There, there is hardly a dip between the -13.5% effect in the 0-cite bin to the -14.1% effect in the 1-cite bin. All the rest of the results are monotonically increasing with the number of cites in the respective bins. On these grounds we are reluctant to take the one exception to the theoretical prediction of monotonically increasing open-access effects as rejection of the theory and instead view the general consistency of the results with the theoretical predictions on a number of dimensions as supporting the theory.
The disaggregated results by quality bin in Table 4 fit in with the aggregate results from Table 3 . This pattern that open access reduces cites in lower bins and increases cites in higher bins echoes the findings from column (2) of Table 3 that open access reduced cites for the bottom-50 journals and increased cites for the top-50 journals. The zero mean effect reported for PubMed in column (3) of Table 3 
Conclusions
In solving some of the methodological problems associated with estimating the causal effect of open access, our previous work (McCabe and Snyder 2014b) uncovered some surprising findings. While open access was found to cause a modest positive boost to cites on average, some content was found to be harmed by open access, in particular, content in the bottom half of journals in our sample of science journals. A further puzzle was that PubMed Central, a convenient repository that should further lower non-pecuniary access costs was found to boost cites less than access through the narrower platform of the journal's own website. This paper offers theoretical and empirical arguments suggesting that the previous results were not statistical flukes but predictable features of the market for academic journals. The intuition here is that open access increases the payoff from acquiring the full text of an article (at least for scholars at institutions that cannot afford the subscription fee for the closed-access journal) while leaving the payoffs of other strategies-not citing it or citing it based on superficial information-unchanged. For the articles of the lowest possible quality, citations decrease because some readers switch from superficially citing to acquiring the full text of these articles. While these readers would have cited these articles unseen, once they acquire them, they are almost certain to find that they are not worth citing. The theory thus shows that a negative open access effect for low-quality content is not a quirk by a predictable outcome from reasonable citation behavior on the part of readers. PubMed access rotates the open-access effect, exaggerating the harms to low-quality content and the benefits to high-quality content, just as would be predicted by a theory under the assumption that PubMed access involves lower non-pecuniary costs than access solely though the journal's own website.
Taken together, these results suggest fairly strong "superstar" effects of open access, a new result in this literature. This substitution away from low-to high-quality articles is evidence of better matching that would appear to benefit readers as well as authors of the higher quality papers. Authors of lower quality articles, as well as lower quality journals, appear to be the net losers in the competition for reader attention. To our knowledge we are the first to suggest a mechanism through which open-access can generate winners and losers and the first to find evidence of this possibility. In future work we hope to explore the strategic and welfare implications of the bias toward superstars generated by open access in journal markets.
Before turning to the proofs of the propositions, we provide several results as additional Lemmas.
Lemma 2. ( ) is increasing in ; ( , ) is non-decreasing in and decreasing in .
Proof. Recalling ( ) = � − , we have
we have
≥ 0.
Lemma 3. ( ) is linear in ; ( , ) is weakly convex in .
Proof. Differentiating the first derivatives from the proofs of the previous lemma yields ′′ ( ) = 0 and Proof of Proposition 1. We first prove 0 ∈ ( ). We have (0) = 0 > − = (0) and (0) = 0 > − = (0, ). Hence 0 ∈ ( ). By continuity, ( ) also contains a neighborhood of above 0. These facts imply ( ) is non-empty. We next show is an interval. Suppose ′ ∈ ( ). We will show ′′ ∈ ( ) for all
, where the first inequality follows from ′ ∈ ( ) and the second inequality follows from ′′ < ′ and Lemma 2. Similarly,
We next show that ( ) is an interval if it is non-empty. Suppose ′ , ′′ ∈ ( ) for some ′ < ′′. We will show ′′′ ∈ ( ) for all ′′′ ∈ ( ′ , ′′).
is weakly concave in because ( ) is linear and ( , ) is weakly convex by Lemma 3. A weakly concave function on an interval is weakly greater than the meet of its values at the endpoints. Hence
Given that and are intervals, and that ( ) is the complement of ( ) ∪ ( ) in [0, ∞), it must be the case that ( ) is constituted by one or two subintervals if it is non-empty.
Because lim →∞ ( ) = ∞ and lim →∞ ( , ) = ∞, one of ( ) or ( ) contains the highest values of . The remainder of the proof is devoted to determining which. First, suppose = 0. Then 
Thus, ( ) contains the largest values of . Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1. We will first show ( ) ⊆ ( ). Take any ∈ ( ). Then 0 > ( ) by definition of ( ), and 0 > ( , ) > ( , ), where the first inequality follows from the definition of ( ) and the second follows from < 0 ⁄ by Lemma 2. But 0 > max{ ( ), ( , )} implies ∈ ( ). Proof of Proposition 3. Substituting = 1 into equation (4) yields
Hence (1, ) − (1, ) = � ( )� − � ( )�, which is non-negative by Lemma 1. Substituting
Proof of Proposition 4. Differentiating equation (4) yields
We then have
Equation (8) follows from differentiating (5). Equation (9) follows from substituting for ( , ) from equation (4) and substituting for ( , )⁄ from (7). Equation (9) is non-negative because � ( )� ≥ � ( )� and � ( )� ≥ � ( )� by Lemma 1. This proves that ∆ is nondecreasing in .
To prove that ∆ is weakly concave in , differentiate (9):
where we have used equation (7). The argument that (9) is non-negative can be used to show that the factor in square brackets in (10) is non-negative. Overall, therefore, (10) is non-positive, implying ∆ is weakly concave in . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider acquisition costs , with ≤ . Arguments similar to the proof of Lemma 1 can be used to show
Substituting and in turn into (9) and subtracting the results yields
The first term in square brackets is non-negative by (11) and the second term in square brackets is nonpositive by (12). Overall, therefore, the last expression is non-negative. Q.E.D. marginal effects given by exp(β ) -1, where β is the Poisson regression coefficient and exp(β ) is the incidence rate ratio. Regressions include article fixed effects; publication year x citation year effects; journal-specific, quadratic age profiles; and indicators for partial and full online access. Robust standard errors clustered at the journal level reported in parentheses. The reported sample size is smaller than in Table 1 because we report observations remaining after dropping articles having only one year of citation data or receiving no cites over the sample period (so dependent variable is constant within the fixed-effect group for these). Significantly different from 0 in a twotailed test at the *10% level, **5% level, ***1% level. Poisson regression coefficient and exp(β ) is the incidence rate ratio. Regressions include article fixed effects, publication year x citation year effects, and a different linearc age profile for each journal. Regressions also include online-access variables analogous to those reported in the table, but reflecting partial access (access only to part of a volume's content or only for part of the year). Robust standard errors clustered at the journal level reported in parentheses. Significantly different from 0 in a two-tailed test at the *10% level, **5% level, ***1% level. Bins and reported results in panel B are articles whose cites in the selection period (first two years after publication) fall into that percentile compared to other articles published in the same year. Bins in panel C are articles having that number of cites in selection period for alternative partition to panel A. In all panels, observations in selection period are omitted from the regressions, reducing the sample size relative to that reported in Table 1 . Sample size further reduced by dropping articles having only one year of citation data and by dropping observations receiving no cites in ex post period (so dependent variable is constant within fixed-effect group for them). Regressions use Wooldridge's (1999) PQML procedure. Dependent variable is cites to an article in a citing year. Results converted into marginal effects given by exp(β ) -1, where β is the Poisson regression coefficient and exp(β ) is the incidence rate ratio. Regressions include article fixed effects; publication year x citation year effects; journal-specific, linear age profiles; and indicators for partial and full online access. Robust standard errors clustered at the journal level reported in parentheses. Significantly different from 0 in a two-tailed test at the *10% level, **5% level, ***1% level. Table 4 . Black points are coefficients on full open access interacted with PubMed access from column (2) of Table 4 . Coefficients are graphed against the median cites during the selection period for that bin. Grey and black curves are quadratic regression lines through points of associated color.
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